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Recent Decisions
CONVEYANCE OF REAL ESTATE-PAROL GIFT OF LAND-STATUTE OF
FRAUDS-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that an al-
leged parol gift of land between blood relatives lacked immediate
donative intent and a clear and unambiguous acceptance, where
the donee rejected conveyances of the same property, because of
issues collateral to the gift and independent of the disputed prop-
erty interest.
Fuisz v Fuisz, 527 Pa 348, 591 A2d 1047 (1991).
During the 1930s, defendant-appellant Margaret Fuisz
("mother") and her husband purchased fifty acres of land and a
farm house in Lower Nazareth Township, Pennsylvania.' During
the 1960s, the mother and her husband gave their two children,
plaintiff-appellee Richard ("son") and Robert Fuisz, several sub-
divisions of their land by fully executed deeds of conveyance. In
1972, the son constructed a house, valued between $40,000 and
$70,000, on two and one-half acres (hereinafter "the parcel") of
land that were owned by his parents but not deeded to him.3 The
son constructed the house with the full knowledge and consent of
his parents and lived there until 1979.4 The parents paid the par-
cel's property taxes and maintained dominion and control over a
rental cottage on the land.5 The parents charged their son no rent
1. Fuisz v Fuisz, 527 Pa 348, 591 A2d 1047, 1048 (1991). Anton Fuisz died in 1982
and was not a defendant in this lawsuit. Fuisz, 591 A2d at 1048.
2. Id. Richard Fuisz was a highly educated physician and entrepreneur. Id at 1049.
3. Id at 1048.
4. Id. The son paid for utilities, expenses and most of the maintenance associated
with the house and lawn; however, he paid his parents no rent. Id. After a divorce in 1979,
the son's ex-wife and children continued to reside in the house. Id.
5. Id. The mother's maintenance man may have mowed the parcel's lawn on certain
occasions. Id.
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for the parcel.6
In 1982, the mother offered her son a deed for the parcel.7 The
son rejected this deed, however, because it lacked an easement to
access his parents' driveway and did not permit the use of their
barn.8 Subsequent family disharmony precluded any further offers
for the conveyance of the disputed parcel."
In 1987, the son filed a suit in equity against his mother in the
Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County, alleging that his
mother breached an oral agreement to convey the parcel,10 and
sought to obtain legal title through a decree of specific perform-
ance.1 The mother filed an answer denying the existence of an oral
agreement,"2 averring that damages were an adequate remedy and
raising the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations.' 3 The
mother alleged that she offered to make a gift of the parcel on sev-
eral occasions, however the son did not accept these offers.' 4 The
mother offered her son the options to either move the house or to
allow his ex-wife to continue living there.
15
The trial judge, sitting as chancellor in a non-jury trial, found
that the evidence was insufficient to establish a contract.16 Instead,
6. Id.
7. Id. The father was adjudicated incompetent, therefore requiring conveyance by
the mother only. Fuisz v Fuisz, No 1987-CE-651, slip op at 5 (Pa Corn P1, Northampton
Cty, Nov 17, 1988).
8. Fuisz, 591 A2d at 1048.
9. Id.
10. Id at 1049. The son claimed that the consideration for the contract consisted of
love and affection and that he did much for his parents, such as providing gifts of money
and luxury cars. Id. However, the son's complaint did not allege the existence of a parol gift.
Id.
11. Id. "The doctrine of specific performance is that, where money damages would be
an inadequate compensation for the breach of an agreement, the contractor or vendor will
be compelled to perform specifically what he has agreed to do; e.g. ordered to execute a
specific conveyance of land." Black's Law Dictionary 1138 (West, 6th ed 1990).
However, where a contract is within the Statute of Frauds, 33 Pa Stat § 1 (Purdon 1967),
specific performance is not an available remedy. Robert Levin, Russell Levin and Leonard
Levin, Summary of Pennsylvania Jurisprudence, Real Property I § 216 at 184 (Law Co-op,
1958), citing Polka v May, 383 Pa 80, 118 A2d 154 (1955).
12. Fuisz v Fuisz, 386 Pa Super 591, 563 A2d 540 (1989), alloc granted, 525 Pa 646,
581 A2d 572 (1990), rev'd, 527 Pa 348, 591 A2d 1047 (1991). The mother's primary defense
was based upon her revocation of the oral offer. Fuisz, No 1987-CE-651 at 4.
13. Fuisz, 563 A2d at 540.
14. Fuisz, 591 A2d at 1049. The mother made these offers before becoming alienated
from her son. Id.
15. Id. Both parties agreed that it was possible to relocate the house and that $81,000
was the fair market value of the house excluding the land and rental cottage, which were
valued at $47,200. Id.
16. Fuisz, 563 A2d at 540.
724
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an adjudication and decree nisi 17 were entered granting specific
performance for conveyance of the parcel on the basis of a parol
s
gift of land.1 9 Over the mother's exceptions to this decree, the
judge ordered the decree final.2 0 The mother appealed to the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court,2 which affirmed the decision of the trial
court.2 2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the mother's
appeal.
23
On appeal, the supreme court considered whether the superior
court erred in affirming the chancellor's finding that the mother
made a valid parol gift to her son when she testified that, in 1972,
she told her son to "take the land whenever he wished," and the
son built a house, treated the parcel as his own, but declined to
accept a deed as a matter of convenience. 4 The mother argued
17. A decree nisi is "a provisional decree, which will be made absolute on motion
unless cause be shown against it." Black's Law Dictionary 411 (West, 6th ed 1990).
18. Parol is "expressed or evidenced by speech only; as opposed to by writing or by
sealed instrument [such as a common law deed for the conveyance of land]." Id at 1116.
19. Fuisz, 563 A2d at 540. In Fuisz, No 1987-CE-651 at 6, the chancellor refused to
consider family arguments and allegations that the son in 1982 and 1983 failed to show his
mother love and respect, or that the mother favored other family members over her son.
Instead, the chancellor discarded emotion and considered that:
Equity is loth to undo a gift or contract at the instance of one who has neglected to
move for its rescission until the passing years have grafted new equities upon the
transaction, until the donee. . has spent the prime of his manhood in the use and
improvement of a property long regarded as his own.
Id, quoting Sower's Administrator v Weaver, 84 Pa 262, 268 (1877).
20. Fuisz, 563 A2d at 540. The chancellor stated that the doctrine of equitable estop-
pel applied to this dispute. Fuisz, No 1987-CE-651 at 6.
21. Fuisz, 591 A2d at 1049. On appeal, the mother raised five issues: (1) the trial
court acted improperly in granting relief on grounds different than the son alleged in his
complaint, (2) the court erred in applying the law of specific performance to the case, (3) the
court erred in failing to grant the mother's motion for nonsuit at the conclusion of the son's
case, (4) the court erred in failing to find a violation of the statute of limitations, and (5) the
court erred in failing to find that damages were adequate compensation. Fuisz, 563 A2d at
541.
22. Fuisz, 563 A2d at 540. The superior court held that the equitable remedy of spe-
cific performance was proper even though the son's original prayer did not ask the court to
find a gift; that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in finding donative intent
in the making of a gift; and that the statute of limitations was not an affirmative defense in
this equity action. Id at 541-42.
The court referenced Concorde Investments, Inc. v Gallagher, 345 Pa Super 49, 497 A2d
637 (1985), and noted that due to real estate's unique character, the remedy of specific
performance in equity is appropriate when substantial improvements were made to the
land. Fuisz, 563 A2d at 542.
23. Fuisz v Fuisz, 525 Pa 646, 581 A2d 572 (1990).
24. Fuisz, 591 A2d at 1049-50. The son was dissatisfied because the deed did not
grant the right to use his parents' driveway and barn. Id at 1050. However, the son also did
not want graphic evidence of a conveyance in the 1970s because it could endanger the well-
being of his terminally ill father. Id at 1051 n 2. In addition, because of his marital difficul-
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that substantial evidence did not support the existence of a valid
parol gift of real estate consistent with the requirements of In re
Yarnall's Estate.25 Furthermore, the mother alleged that the supe-
rior court's decision conflicted with Pennsylvania case law in Van
Buskirk v Van Buskirk.
2 6
The supreme court,2" in an opinion by Justice Flaherty,2 consid-
ered whether the parties met the requirements of Yarnall's Estate
for the creation of a valid parol gift of land.29 The requirements for
the creation of a valid parol gift (hereinafter the "three-part test")
include: (1) direct, positive, express, and unambiguous evidence of
a gift, (2) exclusive, open, notorious, adverse, and continuous pos-
session of the land that is taken at the time or immediately after
the making of the gift, and (3) the donee made valuable improve-
ments to the property that cannot adequately be compensated by
damages. °
ties, the son did not want the parcel subject to any future divorce settlement. Id.
25. 376 Pa 582, 103 A2d 753, 758 (1954). See note 30 and accompanying text; Brief
for Appellant at 4, Fuisz, 591 A2d 1047 (1991).
26. 378 Pa Super 418, 548 A2d 1270 (1988), alloc granted, 524 Pa 630, 574 A2d 71
(1990), vacated on other grounds, 527 Pa 218, 590 A2d 4 (1991); Brief for Appellant at 4,
Fuisz, 591 A2d 1047 (1991). In Van Buskirk, parents attempted to give real property to
their son and his wife. A deed was executed and notarized. However, the deed was neither
recorded nor delivered because the father was concerned about his son's marital problems.
Van Buskirk, 548 A2d at 1271. Nevertheless, the son and his wife started construction of a
home using funds primarily provided by the parents. Id. The trial court ruled that there was
a valid parol gift. Id. The superior court reversed and held that there was no gift because
there was no delivery of a deed, there was no intent by the father to effect an immediate
transfer, and the parents maintained dominion and control over the property and financed
the house. Id at 1271-72. Moreover, failure of the father to deliver the deed corroborated his
lack of donative intent. Id. The supreme court vacated this decision because the parents
were indispensable parties to the dispute. Van Buskirk v Van Buskirk, 527 Pa 218, 590 A2d
4, 7 (1991) (this case was not cited by the supreme court in Fuisz).
27. The court noted that their scope of "appellate review of equity matters is limited
to a determination of whether the chancellor committed an error of law or abused his discre-
tion." Fuisz, 591 A2d at 1049-50, citing Sack v Feinman, 489 Pa 152, 413 A2d 1059, 1066
(1980). A final decree in equity is not disturbed unless it is unsupported by the evidence or
demonstrably capricious. Fuisz, 591 A2d at 1050.
28. Justice Flaherty was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Nix and by Justices
McDermott, Zappala, Papadakos, and Cappy. Fuisz, 591 A2d at 1048. Justice Larsen filed a
dissenting opinion. Id at 1051.
29. Id at 1049.
30. Yarnall's Estate, 103 A2d at 758. Accord Rarry v Shimek, 360 Pa 315, 62 A2d 46
(1948).
A "purported donee must meet a very stringent test of establishing by clear, precise, and
indubitable evidence that the purported donor, at the time of transferring possession, mani-
fested an intention to make a gift of legal title." Levin, Summary of Pennsylvania Jurispru-
dence § 214 at 182 (cited in note 11), citing Shellhammer v Ashbaugh, 83 Pa 24 (1876). The
donee must also establish:
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The general requirements for the conveyance of real property
through the delivery and acceptance of a deed, provided by the
Statute of Frauds,31 are not required when the stringent require-
ments of Yarnall's Estate are clearly met.3 2 However, between a
parent and child, evidence of an even more clear and weighty na-
ture is required for a parol gift of land.3 On review, the supreme
court determined that the record did not contain direct, positive,
express, and unambiguous evidence of a clear and weighty nature
to establish the mother's gift. 4
The court noted that the chancellor's finding was based on infer-
ences, as opposed to direct testimony from either party, that a gift
was completed.3 5 Instead, the chancellor inferred a gift because of
the son's reliance in constructing the house and making valuable
improvements on his parents' land, and his expectation that he
would eventually own the property.36 Nevertheless, this reliance
merely satisfied the third element of the three-part Yarnall's Es-
an unequivocal change of possession and. . . such valuable improvements as to make
it inequitable not to recognize as valid the oral gift. In other words, an oral gift or
promise to convey real property will be enforced in equity where there has been part
performance thereof by the donee, or acts have been done by him in reliance on the
promise which placed him in a situation that will result in fraud or prejudice to him
unless the promise is performed.
Levin, Summary of Pennsylvania Jurisprudence § 214 at 182 (cited in note 11), citing
Greenwich Coal & Coke Co. v Learn, 234 Pa 180, 83 A 74 (1912).
31. 33 Pa Stat § 1 provides, in pertinent part, that:
interests of freehold. . . made or created... by parol, and not put in writing, and
signed by the parties . . . shall have the force and effect of leases or estates at will
only, and shall not, either in law or equity, be deemed or taken to have any other or
greater force or effect, any consideration for making any such parol leases or estates,
or any former law or usage to the contrary notwithstanding.
Statute of Frauds, 33 Pa Stat § 1 (1967).
32. Fuisz, 591 A2d at 1049. The supreme court noted that the policy of the three-part
test exists to encourage the proper transfer of real property by deed, and to foreclose any
questionable claims of ownership in another's property. Id.
33. Id, citing Yarnall's Estate, 103 A2d at 758; Rarry, 62 A2d at 48. In Glass v
Tremellen, 294 Pa 436, 144 A 413 (1928), the supreme court provided the rationale for re-
quiring weightier evidence of a parol gift between parents and children:
Nothing is more common than that a father speaks of a farm, upon which he has
placed a son, as the son's farm, or a house in which he permits the son to live, as the
son's house. It is every day's occurrence that a father speaks of having given a lot of
ground to a son, when it is plain there was no intention to transfer the ownership.
* * * Were courts to look at the language of parents, expressed to others, as evidences
of title in children, it would annihilate domestic confidence, and it would doubtless,
in most cases, be giving an effect to loose declarations that was never intended.
Glass, 144 A at 413-14, quoting Ackerman v Fisher, 57 Pa 457, 459 (1868).
34. Fuisz, 591 A2d at 1049.




Although the mother testified that, in 1972, the son "could take
the land whenever he wished," the son did not accept ownership. 8
Moreover, the son testified that he "deferred taking a conveyance"
until 1982.19 The mother also testified that, in 1982, she told her
son that "he should have [the land] surveyed and take as much
land as he wants."40 Although the son surveyed the land in antici-
pation of a future gift, he declined to accept the deed.41 Based
upon that testimony, the court concluded that in both instances, in
1972 and 1982, this "indirect, inferential and ambiguous" evidence
"fell short of an express declaration of an immediately effective
gift.,
42
The supreme court, citing In re Rogan's Estate43 and Wagner v
Wagner,4 stated that a transfer of ownership by gift requires that
there be a present donative intent, and not merely an intention to
make a gift at some future time.45 A donor's mere intent to make a
future gift and a donee's expectation to receive that gift are not
substitutes for an actual gift.
46
In reviewing the chancellor's decision, the supreme court dis-
agreed that the 1982 deed inferred a prior gift of land.47 Moreover,
because the mother used the delivery of deeds to effect previous
gifts of land, there arose an implication that the delivery of a deed
was neither a superfluous act nor a mere affirmation of a prior pa-
rol gift.48 Furthermore, the son's complaint failed to allege that he
received a parol gift, but instead admitted that he deferred taking
a conveyance of the parcel.49
Finally, the supreme court cited In re Sipe's Estate5" and Wag-
ner for authority that the donee's acceptance is a necessary ele-
37. Id.
38. Id. See note 24.
39. Fuisz, 591 A2d at 1050.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id at 1049-50.
43. 404 Pa 205, 171 A2d 177, 180 (1961).
44. 466 Pa 532, 353 A2d 819, 821-22 (1976).
45. Fuisz, 591 A2d at 1050.
46. Id.
47. Id. "When one offers to convey land by deed, it cannot be presumed that the
proposed recipient already owns the land through a prior gift." Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 492 Pa 125, 422 A2d 826 (1980).
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ment of a valid gift.51 Because the son failed to accept a convey-
ance of the parcel at any time from 1972 through 1982, he "failed
to make a clear and unambiguous acceptance. ' 5 2 Therefore, the su-
preme court held that the son failed to satisfy the standards set
forth in Yarnall's Estate and failed to prove the existence (and
express acceptance) of an immediately effective parol gift from his
mother by direct, positive, express and unambiguous evidence of a
clear and weighty nature.53 The evidence of record did not meet
the standards required to establish a parol gift of land between a
parent and a child. 54 Therefore, the supreme court reversed the su-
perior court's decision.
55
Justice Larsen filed a dissenting opinion noting that, although
the Yarnall's Estate standards were correctly articulated, the ma-
jority's additional test, which required the acceptance of a written
instrument to confirm the parcel's conveyance, made "no sense.
'56
Although acceptance is a required element, documentation of the
acceptance is not an essential element in a parol gift between a
mother and her son.57 Therefore, the only proper question on ap-
peal was whether there was clear and weighty parol evidence of a
gift.5 8
Justice Larsen examined whether the record was "devoid of di-
rect and unambiguous evidence that a gift was made. '5' However,
unlike the majority, Justice Larsen found that the mother testified
in clear and certain terms that she gave the parcel to her son."0
Therefore, because this testimony provided abundant parol evi-
dence of a gift that was both made and accepted, Justice Larsen
51. Fuisz, 591 A2d at 1051.
52. Id.
53. Id at 1049, 1051.
54. Id at 1051.
55. Id.
56. Id (Larsen dissenting).
57. Id. Justice Larsen noted that, in 1972, the son built the house with his own
money and treated the property as his own. Id. Furthermore, his subsequent divorce prop-
erty settlement agreement permitted his wife to live on the property for as long as she
wished. Id. Therefore, Justice Larsen disagreed that the facts did not support a clear and
unambiguous (implied) acceptance by the son. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. The mother testified, "I've given [the property] to [my son] twice." Id at 1051 n
1, quoting Deposition of Margaret Fuisz at 10 (May 5, 1987). Furthermore, during the trial
she also stated, "I gave [my son] that land. I offered that land to him a number of times.
And the last time when he had it surveyed, I told him he could take as much as he wanted."
Id at 1051 n 1, quoting Notes of Testimony at 17 (Jan 27, 1988) (emphasis in original).
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would have affirmed the order of the superior court."
In order to fully understand the Fuisz holding, a review of prior
Pennsylvania cases that developed and interpreted the three-part
test for a valid parol gift of land is necessary. In Yarnall's Estate,
the three-part test was applied to a widow contesting a life estate
62
against her children.6 3 After the decedent's death, the widow and
her two children each shared one-third interests in real estate.
6 4
The mother alleged that her children gave her a life estate out of
their shares.6 The court first examined whether the evidence sup-
ported a direct, positive, express and unambiguous gift of a life
estate.6 Unfortunately, the testimony indicated that the children
favored a gift of only four to five years67 and they intended to
maintain their fair share of dominion and control through the pay-
ment of taxes.6 ' The testimony also indicated that only the chil-
dren, and no additional witnesses, were present when the alleged
gift was made. 9 The court concluded that these factors evidenced
that the children gave no more than mere permissive use.
70
Secondly, the widow failed the immediate and exclusive posses-
sion test because she continued to occupy the premises with her
daughter after the death of her husband."' In fact, her daughter
resided with her for two or three years, and the widow only exclu-
sively controlled the real estate after the departure of her daugh-
ter.72 Here, the court emphasized the importance of taking posses-
sion "in pursuance of and immediately following"7 3 a parol gift.74
61. Fuisz, 591 A2d at 1051 (Larsen dissenting).
62. A life estate is "an estate whose duration is limited to the life of the [tenant]
holding it.. . . Upon the death of the life tenant, the property will go to the holder of the
remainder interest or to the grantor by reversion." Black's Law Dictionary 924 (West, 6th
ed 1990).
63. Yarnall's Estate, 103 A2d at 758.
64. Id at 755. As a tenant in common with her children, the mother owned an undi-
vided one-third interest in the estate for her life and a one-third interest in the remainder.
65. Id. In other words, the mother alleged that her two children gave their one-third
interests in the estate for her life in exchange for her gift of a one-third interest in the
remainder.
66. Id at 758.
67. Id. Hence, the children contended that they merely gave one-third interests in
the estate for a term of years, and not for their mother's life, in exchange for the mother's
one-third interest in the remainder.
68. Id.
69. Id at 755.
70. Id at 758.
71. Id.
72. Id at 758-59.
73. Id. Similarly, in oral contracts for the sale of land, the purchaser must take pos-
session "at the time when or immediately after [the oral contract] was entered into." Levin,
Vol. 30:723
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Finally, the court examined whether the widow made valuable,
permanent improvements to the property for which compensation
would be inadequate.7 Although the widow did pay for repairs and
maintenance, she made no improvements.7 6 Therefore, these cir-
cumstances precluded any equitable remedy, because the payment
of maintenance, or even partial taxes, was easily compensated by
monetary damages if not by the free rental use of the property.
77
Hence, because of the failure of these tests, the children received
their shares through a partition of the property.
7 s
While the burden of proof for donative intent in a parol gift var-
ies significantly upon whether the donor and donee are relatives or
merely strangers, 9 variations also exist depending upon whether
the gift is money or real estate.80 In Wagner, a father filed suit for
the return of corporate stock by his five children, the sole asset of
the corporation being a parcel of real estate s.8 The chancellor ad-
dressed the question of whether the father possessed the donative
intent to make an immediate and valid parol gift to his children.2
In considering the evidence, the chancellor rejected the father's
testimony and accepted the children's testimony, which provided a
reasonable inference that the father intended to make an immedi-
ate parol gift. 3 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the chancel-
lor and noted that the relation of parent and child supported this
Summary of Pennsylvania Jurisprudence § 210 at 178-79 (cited in note 11). Compare with
note 107.
74. The supreme court rejected the question of adverse possession because the
widow's possession of the house was neither "adverse" nor "hostile," but instead was "per-
missive." Yarnall's Estate, 103 A2d at 759.
75. Id at 758. "The requirement of the law that the improvements be such that com-
pensation would be inadequate does not mean that no amount of compensation, however
large, would be sufficient, but that it would be impracticable, if not impossible, to determine
such amount with-any fair degree of accuracy by ordinary and available standards." Id.
Similarly, in oral contracts for the sale of land, such improvements must: (1) add value
and be permanent, (2) not be compensable through monetary damages, and (3) not be rein-
bursable by ordinary profits during the purchaser's possession. Levin, Summary of Pennsyl-
vania Jurisprudence § 211 at 180 (cited in note 11).
76. Yarnall's Estate, 103 A2d at 759.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Rarry, 62 A2d at 48.
80. Compare Yarnall's Estate, 103 A2d at 758 (finding insufficient evidence of dona-
tive intent in an alleged parol gift of land from children to their mother) with Wagner, 353
A2d at 821-23 (finding sufficient evidence of donative intent in a parol gift of corporate
stock from a father to his children).
81. Wagner, 353 A2d at 820-21.




In re Yeager's Estate8 5 provides a similar example where a fa-
ther, prior to surgery, entrusted his daughter with money and se-
curities."6 However, after his daughter's subsequent death, the fa-
ther alleged that these were gifts causa mortis 87 to the daughter.8
The supreme court ruled in favor of the daughter's estate and
stated that in gifts from parent to child, as opposed to gifts be-
tween strangers, the donor's acts are natural and require less de-
monstrative evidence of donative intent.
89
Nevertheless, in parol gifts of real estate between parents and
their children, a different rule of law applies. In Montrenes v Mon-
trenes,90 a son filed suit to quiet title in real estate that his mother
deeded to his sister.9 The son alleged that his mother gave him a
parol gift of this land, that he and his wife restored two dwellings
that were damaged by fire, and that they thereafter resided in one
of the houses. 2 The trial court considered the testimony of three
witnesses who stated that the mother frequently discussed her gift
to her son.9 Nevertheless, the court found insufficient evidence to
establish a parol gift.
9 4
On appeal, the superior court affirmed and stated that clearer
and weightier evidence is necessary to prove a parol gift between
parent and child than between persons who are not blood rela-
tives.9 5 The proof of a parol gift between parent and child requires
that "the witnesses . ..must have heard the bargain when made
and their testimony must bring the parties face to face; the trans-
action must not be inferred merely from the declarations of one of
84. Id at 822 n 7. The supreme court stated, "Because gifts from parents to their
children are natural and common, donative intent may be found more readily in cases in-
volving such gifts than in cases in which the donor and donee are not so related." Id, citing
McClements v McClements, 411 Pa 257, 191 A2d 814 (1963); Thompson v Curwensville
Water Co., 400 Pa 380, 162 A2d 198 (1960); Brightbill v Boeshore, 385 Pa 69, 122 A2d 38
(1956).
85. 273 Pa 359, 117 A 67 (1922).
86. Yeager's Estate, 117 A at 67.'
87. A gift causa mortis is "a gift of personal property made in expectation of donor's
death and on condition that donor die as anticipated." Black's Law Dictionary 688 (West,
6th ed 1990).
88. Yeager's Estate, 117 A at 67-68.
89. Id at 68.
90. 355 Pa Super 403, 513 A2d 983 (1986).
91. Montrenes, 513 A2d at 983-84.
92. Id at 984.
93. Id.
94. Id.




Another requirement of both donative intent and a valid parol
gift, as noted in Rogan's Estate, is that the donor must exhibit "an
intention to make an immediate gift" to the donee.s7 A gift made
purely for convenience, with the donor intending to maintain do-
minion and control until his death, does not qualify as a gift inter
vivoses and is at best testamentary.9 Nevertheless, less concrete
equitable considerations, involving both the donor and the donee,
are not always disregarded by the courts. 00
In Rarry v Shimek,'0' a servant worked for a farmer who owned
a tract of land for twenty-two years. 0 2 The farmer built a house on
this land and, upon completion, the servant and his wife immedi-
ately moved in and made numerous improvements to the prop-
erty.103 However, after nearly ten years, the farmer deeded the
house to new owners who subsequently filed suit to eject the ser-
vant.1 04 The trial court directed a verdict for the owners and the
servant appealed.10 5 On appeal, the supreme court reversed and in-
voked the three-part test to establish a valid parol gift of land, 06
96. Id at 985, citing Rarry, 62 A2d at 48; Ackerman, 57 Pa at 459.
97. Rogan's Estate, 171 A2d at 180.
98. A gift inter vivos is a gift "between the living, which [is] perfected and become[s]
absolute during [the] lifetime of donor and donee." Black's Law Dictionary 688 (West, 6th
ed 1990).
99. Rogan's Estate, 171 A2d at 180.
100. See note 19.
101. 360 Pa 315, 62 A2d 46 (1948).
102. Rarry, 62 A2d at 47.
103. Id at 48-49.
104. Id at 47.
105. Id.
106. The three-part test for a valid parol gift of land may be compared and contrasted
with the parallel rule for an oral contract for the sale of land subject to partial performance.
In Concorde Investments, 497 A2d 637, the superior court stated that partial performance,
benefiting the party invoking the Statute of Frauds, may bar the rule where: (1) there has
been an oral contract (versus direct, positive, express, and unambiguous evidence of a gift),
(2) the property was occupied by continuous and exclusive possession (versus immediate
exclusive, open, notorious, adverse, and continuous possession), and (3) improvements were
made by the buyer not readily compensable in money (versus valuable improvements). Con-
corde Investments, 497 A2d at 640 (emphasis added).
However, in Kurland v Stolker, 516 Pa 587, 533 A2d 1370 (1987), the supreme court pro-
vided a more comparable test and stated:
[(1)] The terms of the contract must be shown by full, complete, and satisfactory
proof. . . [, (2) it] must establish the fact that possession was taken in pursuance of
the contract, and, at or immediately after the time it was made, the fact that the
change of possession was notorious, and the fact that it has been exclusive, continu-
ous and maintained. . [, and (3)] performance or part performance. . .could not
be compensated in damages, and such as would make rescission inequitable and
unjust.
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notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds.1 7 The court discounted the
need for direct evidence that the donor made the gift to the donee
"face to face" and stated that a gift transaction could be inferred
from the direct testimony of one of the parties. 08 However, the
ten-year period of time that the servant possessed the home was an
important equitable consideration. 10 9
Finally, acceptance, in the absence of express renunciation, is a
required element in any gift. 10 Questions often arise, however,
whether such acceptance must be express or implied. In Sipe's Es-
tate, the decedent executed a signature card, in his name and the
donee's name, to create a joint savings account."' The donee did
not personally sign the signature card; however, the decedent gave
the donee a passbook for the account." 2 About two weeks before
the decedent's demise, the donee returned the passbook because
the decedent's income tax return was due." 3 After the decedent's
death, his executor possessed the passbook and challenged the va-
lidity of the gift to the donee.
114
The supreme court stated that the requirements for a gift inter
vivos are intent,115 delivery and acceptance."6 Acceptance need not
Kurland, 533 A2d at 1373.
107. Rarry, 62 A2d at 47-49. "The celebrated Statute of Frauds is one of the most
formidable and salutary safeguards of property in the lexicon of law. Through its applica-
tion, title to land acquires a firmness and permanence as solid and enduring as the particu-
lar piece of earth to which it gives metes, bounds and a name." Klingensmith v Klingen-
smith, 375 Pa 178, 100 A2d 76, 77 (1953) (footnote omitted).
The object of the statute is to prevent the assertion of verbal understandings in the
creation of interests or estates in land and to obviate the opportunity for fraud and
perjury. It is not a mere rule of evidence, but a declaration of public policy. In the
absence of equities sufficient of themselves to take the case out of the statute, it
operates as a limitation upon judicial authority to afford a remedy unless renounced
or waived by the party entitled to claim its protection.
Kurland, 533 A2d at 1372, quoting Haskell v Heathcote, 363 Pa 184, 69 A2d 71, 73 (1949).
"The owner of land is fortified in his ownership and to compel him to relinquish it. . . a
writing bearing his signature must exist or an exception to the rule of this statute [must be]
established." Hoyle v Dunstan, 57 Lack Jur 109, 112 (Pa Com P1, Lackawanna Cty 1955).
108. Rarry, 62 A2d at 48.
109. Id at 49. See note 19.
110. Sipe's Estate, 422 A2d at 828.
111. Id at 827.
112. Id at 827-28.
113. Id at 829.
114. Id.
115. Evidence of insufficient donative intent is illustrated by an example:
At the marriage of S to B, S's father, F, declared that he intended to give his son a
home. Thereafter F built a home close to his own and when it was completed, gave
his son S the keys and told him to move in. S thanked F and moved into the home.
He lived there many years and made many valuable improvements. F continued to
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be express and is presumed "in the absence of express renuncia-
tion" when the gift is beneficial to the donee."' The court stated
that the formality of signing a document, such as a signature card,
to acknowledge acceptance is not required." 8 The donee's return of
the passbook, merely for income tax reasons, was not a renuncia-
tion of the gift."9
When examined in the context of prior Pennsylvania decisions,
the holding of Fuisz, especially in light of Justice Larsen's dissent,
apparently adds clear and unambiguous acceptance of a written in-
strument as a fourth element to the three-part Yarnall's Estate
test. One method of understanding the Fuisz holding is to examine
what it should not mean. This is accomplished through a hypothet-
ical that results in an absurd consequence.
R orally gives E, a blood relative, land in fee simple absolute. 20
Direct, positive, express, and unambiguous evidence supports their
face to face meeting at the alleged making of this gift. However, E
fails to expressly accept the gift. Nevertheless, immediately there-
after, E takes exclusive, open, notorious, adverse, and continuous
possession of the land. E also relies on the gift and makes valuable
improvements to the land. These improvements are unique and
monetary damages would be inadequate compensation for E's rea-
sonable reliance in this gift. Ten years later, R conveys by deed a
life estate to E of the same land with a reversion to R. Upon exam-
pay taxes on the property. No deed was ever given by F to S. F died devising all of
his real estate to X. In an action of ejectment by X against S, held for X. S cannot
establish a gift by parol. Evidence of F's intention is not sufficiently clear.
Levin, Summary of Pennsylvania Jurisprudence § 214 at 182-83 (cited in note 11), citing
Johns v Johns, 244 Pa 48, 90 A 535 (1914).
116. Sipe's Estate, 422 A2d at 828. Moreover, this rule is applied to all cases such as
gifts of money, bank accounts, stock or farm animals. Id.
117. Id, citing Ray Andrews Brown, The Law of Personal Property § 50 at 146
(Raushenbush, 2nd ed 1975).
118. Sipe's Estate, 422 A2d at 828. The court placed the burden of proof, by clear and
convincing evidence, on the executor to demonstrate the absence of a gift inter vivos. Id at
829. Nevertheless, Justice Roberts, writing for the dissent, strongly noted that black letter
law places this heavy burden on the donee. Id. Because the donee's signature was a "sham,"
the decedent continued to exercise dominion and control over the property such that deliv-
ery never occurred. Id at 830.
119. Id at 829.
120. A fee simple absolute is defined as:
An estate limited absolutely to a person and his or her heirs and assigns forever with-
out limitation or condition. An absolute or fee-simple estate is one in which the owner
is entitled to the entire property, with unconditional power of disposition during
one's life, and descending to one's heirs and legal representatives upon one's death
intestate. Such estate is unlimited as to duration, disposition, and descendibility.
Black's Law Dictionary 615 (West, 6th ed 1990).
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ination of the deed, E objects to the limited duration and
descendibility of the estate. Therefore, not wishing to cloud his pu-
tative title in fee simple absolute, E rejects the deed because it
merely provides a life estate. Unable to receive a suitable deed, E
files suit to obtain the equitable remedy of specific performance.
The chancellor denies relief, after applying a "four-part test," be-
cause there was no express acceptance of the gift or deed.
Assuming that each of the three Yarnall's Estate elements are
met, this hypothetical produces the absurd consequence of the do-
nee's loss of land. Two factors emphasize this absurdity: first, the
donee is faced with either acquiescing to a lessor interest in land
by accepting the deed or, even worse, losing the entire estate
through the renunciation of the deed.'21 Either loss is contradic-
tory to the purpose of the three-part test: to take a parol gift of
real estate out of the Statute of Frauds and provide the entire in-
terest contemplated by the gift.
122
Second, because such a parol gift is out of the Statute, the re-
quirement for a writing can be eliminated. 123 The donated interest
is only limited when the gift is within the Statute. 24 Furthermore,
the supreme court clearly did not overrule the three-part test.
Nevertheless, the implication that acceptance of a deed was added
as a fourth element led Justice Larsen to state, "This makes no
sense."
25
Given this apparent contradiction, the majority opinion of Fuisz
can partially be explained by the discrete events surrounding the
disputed parol gift in 1972 and the uncontested renunciation of the
121. While some jurisdictions hold that acceptance is not rejected by merely returning
a deed to the grantor for safekeeping or for correcting a mistake in the acknowledgement or
property description, others hold that acceptance is negated on return where the deed is
unsatisfactory or where conditions precedent to the acceptance remain executory. 74 ALR2d
Deed-Acceptance § 14 at 1023 (1960).
122. Yarnall's Estate, 103 A2d at 757.
To take a parol contract [or gift] outof the statute, it is necessary not only that it be
partly performed by delivery of the possession, but that it be on a valuable consider-
ation paid or secured to be paid; or in the case of a gift, that there be an expenditure
of money or labor in consequence of it, which comes to the same thing; and this for
the plain reason that no equity arises from the naked delivery of the possession, and
without a specific equity a chancellor would not interfere to compel a conveyance of
the contract.
Id (emphasis added).
123. See Statute of Frauds, 33 Pa Stat § 1 (1967) (providing that "interests of freehold
. . . made or created.. . by parol, and not put in writing, and signed by the parties ...
shall [be] at will only").
124. Id (which limits the freehold interest of a parol gift to an at will possession).
125. Fuisz, 591 A2d at 1051 (Larsen dissenting).
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deed in 1982.126 First, the court found that there was an absence of
donative intent from 1972 until the making of the deed in 1982.127
Thus, the failure of the first element of the three-part test placed
the gift within the Statute of Frauds.
2 8
Second, given the complete failure of the three-part test, only a
valid conveyance, such as the delivery of an executed deed, could
properly transfer title to the land. 29 However, the son's express
renunciation of the 1982 deed clearly failed to meet these
requirements.' °
Finally, dictum in Fuisz states that even if the mother's "actions
... were to be construed as an attempt to make a parol gift, it is
evident that [the son] failed to make a clear and unambiguous
acceptance.'' s3 Although the court cited both Sipe's Estate and
Wagner for the requirement of acceptance in a valid gift, 3 2 both
cases declare that acceptance is inferred where beneficial in the ab-
sence of renunciation.
13 3
126. The court separated the events of 1982 from those of 1972 by stating, "When one
offers to convey land by deed [in 1982], it cannot be presumed that the proposed recipient
already owns the land through a prior [parol] gift [in 1972]." Id at 1050.
127. Id. The court noted that "the statements made by [the mother] in both 1972 and
1982 would certainly have provided a basis for [her son's] expectation that he would eventu-
ally receive the land, they nevertheless fell short of an express declaration of an immediately
effective gift." Id.
The court further concluded (after discussing the absence of acceptance from 1972
through 1982) that, "the evidence relied upon by the chancellor in finding that a gift had
been made was indirect, inferential and ambiguous. Such evidence falls substantially short
of what is required to establish a parol gift of land between a parent and child." Id at 1051.
Two additional factors, not stated by the court, may or may not strengthen the finding of
an invalid parol gift because of the lack of donative intent. First, Montrenes and Rarry
accentuate the need for witnesses of a face to face transaction that is not inferred from the
declarations of one of the parties. Montrenes, 513 A2d at 985. However, it is unreasonable to
assume that the donor's express admission of a face to face meeting would be insufficient
evidence. Instead, the court emphasized that the mother's statements that the son "'could
take the land whenever he wished' . . . fell short . . . of an immediately effective gift."
Fuisz, 591 A2d at 1048 (emphasis added).
Second, Rogan's Estate emphasizes that a donor's intent to maintain dominion and con-
trol disqualifies a gift inter vivos. Rogan's Estate, 171 A2d at 180. The second element of
the three-part test also requires exclusive possession of the land. Yarnall's Estate, 103 A2d
at 758. The son did not possess the rental cottage, did not pay propeity taxes and allowed
his mother's maintenance man to mow the lawn on several occasions. Fuisz, 591 A2d at
1048. Hence, the son did not exclusively possess the land and the mother, at least partially,
exercised dominion and control over a portion of the land.
128. Fuisz, 591 A2d at 1049.
129. Van Buskirk, 548 A2d at 1271.
130. Fuisz, 591 A2d at 1050.
131. Id at 1051 (emphasis added).
132. Id.
133. Wagner, 353 A2d at 821 (stating that, "often there is no express acceptance by
738 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 30:723
Removed from the Statute of Frauds, a conveyance is typically
evidenced by delivery and acceptance13 4 of a deed.3 5 However,
when the three-part test is utilized to provide an equitable remedy,
acceptance may be inferred to benefit the donee because of the
lack of such formalities. Under the three-part test, donative intent
provides evidence of the donor's "offer" to make a parol gift. Simi-
larly, the second and third elements, immediate possession and re-
liance in making valuable improvements, may infer the donee's
"acceptance" of such gift.'3 6
In Fuisz, the son declined to accept a conveyance by deed be-
tween 1972 and 1982,17 although he attempted to accept the al-
leged gift by immediate possession and reliance. 3 8 The court's use
of a "clear and unambiguous" standard for acceptance under these
circumstances must therefore be derived from the first element of
the donee, but if the gift is beneficial to the donee acceptance is presumed in the absence of
evidence of rejection"); Sipe's Estate, 422 A2d at 828 (stating that acceptance need not be
express and is presumed when the gift is beneficial to the donee, "in [the] absence of ex-
press renunciation").
134. "It is ordinarily unnecessary to show any express acceptance of [a] deed by the
grantee. From the moment of the delivery of the deed, the acceptance by the grantee is
presumed in the absence of his dissent, and title thereby passes to him subject to his right
to reject and thereby cause title to revest in the grantor as though the deed had never been
accepted." Levin, Summary of Pennsylvania Jurisprudence § 241 at 207 (cited in note 11),
citing Feeley v Hoover, 130 Pa 107, 18 A 611 (1889) (emphasis added).
The acceptance of a deed by the grantee may be evidenced by his taking or entering
into possession of the property which it purports to convey, or by his using, improv-
ing, or repairing it, or, where he was previously in possession thereof, by continuing
such possession. However, possession of the property is not necessarily conclusive of
the question, and has been held under some circumstances not to constitute accept-
ance of the deed. Also, possession of the property by the grantee is not essential to
acceptance.
In order to predicate acceptance upon the grantee's possession, use, or improve-
ment of the property, it should appear that it was under or by virtue of the deed,
and not independent thereof.
74 ALR2d Deed-Acceptance § 11 at 1017-18 (1960) (emphasis added).
135. Van Buskirk, 548 A2d at 1271. "Even though [a deed] has been duly executed
and acknowledged, [it] does not become effective to pass title unless and until a delivery
thereof from grantor to grantee is established and an acceptance of such delivery by the
grantee is shown." Levin, Summary of Pennsylvania Jurisprudence § 236 at 204 (cited in
note 11), citing 16 Am Jur 497 Deeds §§ 108 et seq (1938).
136. Justice Larsen stated that even in the absence of documentation there was a clear
and unambiguous acceptance because the son considered the land his own after 1972 and
used his own funds to build the house. Fuisz, 591 A2d at 1051 (Larsen dissenting).
137. Id. In the 1970s, the son declined to accept a conveyance of the disputed parcel
for the collateral reasons of his father's ill health and his marital difficulties. Conversely, in
1982, he rejected a deed because of alleged limitations in the property interest defined by
this deed. Id. See note 24.
138. Fuisz, 591 A2d 1048.
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the three-part test. This element requires, in part, clear and unam-
biguous evidence of a gift."3 9 But, the elements of a gift include
intent, delivery and acceptance.4 ' Therefore, the court must hold
a donee's acceptance, and the absence of renunciation, subject to
the same degree of scrutiny that is assigned to a donor's donative
intent.
The three-part Yarnall's Estate test remains a valid exception
to the Statute of Frauds. Nevertheless, under the Fuisz dictum, a
renunciation of a conveyance by deed, for reasons collateral to an
alleged parol gift, that is contemporaneous with an attempted ac-
ceptance by immediate possession and reliance, may sufficiently
cloud a donee's acceptance. The requirement of a clear and unam-
biguous acceptance, which is inferred if it benefits the donee, com-
pels a donee to expressly accept a donor's reasonable offer of con-
veyance by deed. Nevertheless, an attempted conveyance of an
unreasonably restricted property interest, compared to the original
parol gift, should permit rejection of the instrument of conveyance
without clouding either the acceptance or the equitable property
right provided by the three-part test.
Kirk D. Houser
139. Yarnall's Estate, 103 A2d at 758.
140. Sipe's Estate, 422 A2d at 828.
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